

ary at Oak Ridge as Ethel Rosenberg's brother David Greenglass did at Los Alamos, then the story of an aborted red scare operation may be completed. And Oswald's own supposed story of how he came to have an interest in communism—that an "old lady" in New York City gave him a Communist party pamphlet on the Rosenberg case (8)—may need to be re-examined to determine whether Oswald actually said that—or whether red-baiting governmental agencies fabricated that little piece of his biography as well.

#### Notes

1. FBI report from Robert P. Gemberling, 3/25/64, FBI file # DL 100-104-10461 HSCA Record # 180-10104-10382, Agency file #012907, released per P.L. 102-526.
2. Warren Commission Report (U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 728.
3. Deposition of Eugene J. Murret in New Orleans LA November 7, 1978, HSCA File #014009, released per P.L. 102-526, pp. 7,8.
4. House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), vol. IX, p. 86.
5. HSCA, vol. VIII
6. Jerry D. Rose, "The Trip That Never Was: Oswald in Mexico, The Third Decade 1#5 Jul 85, pp. 9-16.
7. Walter and Miriam Schneir, Invitation to an Inquest (Garden City: Doubleday, 1965), chapter 29.
8. This "information" has generally been attributed to an interview with Oswald in Moscow by a UPI reporter, Aline Mosby. See Warren Commission Report p. 695.

### FOLLOW UPS – NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON PREVIOUS ARTICLES

#### 5th Floor Witnesses

The post-assassination movements of three black employees (Norman, Williams and Jarman) on the fifth floor of the TSBD is an issue raised in Weston's "Fifth Floor Sniper" article, issue of May, 1993. A possible new wrinkle on these movements is suggested in a newly-released HSCA document (JFK Document #014899), a 1977 interview with DPD motorcycle officer Marrion (sic) L. Baker. Baker, having long since "coordinated" his version of encountering Oswald in the building with Roy Truly's version (see "Coordinating the Witnesses," January 1985) repeated that story in 1977. Toward the end of the interview, however, he reports having received some new information at the time in 1964 when he went to Washington, D.C. to testify to the Warren Commission. While there, he said he met the "three negro boys who

had been watching the parade from the 5th floor window." These "boys" told Baker that they were "hiding behind boxes" when he searched the 5th floor and that they had seen him, although Baker had not seen the hiding "boys" at that time. These employees have given no such report of hiding activity after the assassination. If Baker's hearsay information is correct, their post-assassination movements need even closer scrutiny. On the other hand, Baker has himself changed his stories at various times, and the new "information" in 1977 may in fact cast more aspersion on his credibility than that of the "boys."

#### FBI at Oswald Arrest Scene

In an article ("They've Got Their Man on Both Accounts," March, 1988) the speculation was offered, in trying to account for the very early information conveyed to FBI Headquarters in Washington that an assassination suspect was in custody, that the Bureau's source of this "information" was SA Robert Barrett, who was rather unaccountably at the scene of the arrest of Oswald, supposedly a suspect only in the Tippit killing at that time. Newly-released HSCA document 014321 contains an 11/22/63 statement by Barrett—as well as that of another FBI agent on the scene, made by SA Bardwell Odum on 11/23/63. Barrett tells of going to the scene of the Tippit shooting and hearing a "female witness" (presumably Helen Markham) say that, "when Tippit got out of his car he went to the back of the car where he was shot by a gunman." (Barrett observed, however, that blood was located near the left front fender) and also a unique version of this "witness's" interaction with the killer, that he told her to "leave him alone or he would shoot her."

At approximately 2:00 (actually ten minutes after Oswald was arrested) Barrett went (by mode of transportation unexplained) to the Texas Theater and entered with the intention of helping to search for the suspect. As the police were scuffling with the suspect, who turned out to be Oswald, he heard Oswald yell loudly "kill all the sons of bitches." Since Oswald has not otherwise been reported as saying any such thing, one wonders if a police officer or perhaps a bystander said "kill the son of a bitch."

Since Barrett has long been the only known FBI agent at the scene of the Oswald arrest, it was logical to assume that he was the source of the FBI headquarters information, less than 8 minutes after the Oswald arrest, that the DPD was enroute to police headquarters with an assassination suspect. The Bardwell Odum statement is an entirely new discovery, and Odum is as likely as Barrett to have made the phone call from the theater to FBI headquarters.

Be that as it may, Odum's statement is shot through with contradictions to the official version of the Oswald arrest. Like Barrett, he was informed (by an unidentified policeman) that a suspect had entered the back door of the TSBD. When he arrived, he posted himself as a guard in the lobby since "there were no officers on guard there." Most interestingly, he said the suspect, whom he later identified as Oswald, was wearing a "reddish brown jacket with zipper open all the way in front." Since Oswald supposedly shed his jacket on his flight from the Tippit murder scene, either Odum was mistaken about the suspect's clothing or there was a different Oswald, perhaps the one who entered the back door when the other entered the front.

#### Paper Sack

Recent critical analysis of Posner's Case Closed has included discussions of the issue whether Wesley Frazier and his sister, Linnie Mae Randle, were witnesses to Oswald's carrying a paper bag on the morning of November 22 which may have contained the supposed assassination rifle. (See the discussions by Folliard and Organ in the November 1993 and March 1994 issues). An earlier article ("Shell Games, Part 1" July 1988) focused on the chain of possession problem of the paper bag, based on the failure of DPD detectives to photograph the bag in place at the crime scene.

At least as late as November 29, according to newly-released FBI document #62-109060-111, the Bureau was worried about the chain of possession of the paper bag. In a Bureau memo on that date, based on a telephone call from SA J.L. Handley to Alex Rosen at FBI headquarters, it is indicated that Wesley Frazier had been shown, at 11:30 p.m. on November 22, a bag that DPD Lt. J.C. Day said had been "recovered" earlier that day. According to Day, Frazier was "unable to identify this sack and told him that a sack he observed in possession of Oswald early that morning was definitely a thin flimsy sack like the one purchased in a dime store." Detective R.D. Lewis reports a similar Frazier response when he was shown the paper bag during a polygraph test.

Detective Lewis offered the opinion that, since the sack shown to Frazier was not identical to the sack in DPD possession it was "possible but not probable" that the DPD Homicide Bureau had recovered a sack like the one described by Frazier but, for some reason, had not put it in evidence. Strangely, DPD Homicide Captain Fritz was not questioned about this "improbable" scenario—Mr. Hadley's next reference to Fritz reports the results of an interview with Frazier in which a curtain rods vs. rifle issue was explored by discussing the length and the weight of the package. The "dime store"

texture of the package described by Frazier was not addressed in this interrogation.

#### Milteer

An article by Scott Van Wynsberghe ("Dead Suspects Part V" January 1988) summarized much of what is known of the activities and associations of Joseph Milteer, who described to an undercover agent on November 9 some details of a planned assassination of President Kennedy. Van Wynsberghe reports that this information was forwarded to the Secret Service on November 12 and may have been the basis for the cancellation of a planned motorcade in Miami on November 18.

It now appears, with a newly-released HSCA document, JFK Document 008814, Secret Service file #CO-2-33 915 X 3-11-5563 S, that the Atlanta office of the Service maintained surveillance on Milteer as well as his right wing associates such as J.B. Stoner and Lee McCloud, both of Atlanta. In a report of 11/14/63, Stoner is characterized by an Atlanta police captain as "one of the most dangerous agitators in the south." As for Milteer, the Atlanta office had made a "thorough investigation" of him as early as October 19, 1963, when he attended the Indianapolis convention of the Constitution Party. The "most suspicious action on his part," said an Atlanta agent, was enroute to Indianapolis when he stopped off in Chattanooga to see Jack Brown, a Klan member whom Atlanta agents considered to be a "dangerous man from bombing standpoints." McCloud is described as a strong segregationist (he had called the Atlanta PD to complain that a "sex pervert and communist" living next door to him had racially mixed parties in his home) but was cleared by the Atlanta police captain as "not a violent-type person" who would not participate in any "illegal activities."

Van Wynsberghe had indicated that the Secret Service asked the Milteer informant, Willie Somersett, to call Milteer at his home to be sure that he was there at the time of the November 18 JFK visit to Miami. In an 11/27/63 memo in the newly-released document, it is shown that the Secret Service once again confirmed that Milteer was home at the time of the assassination. McCloud and Stoner were both home in Atlanta on November 22; strangely, Captain R.E. Little, of the Intelligence Division of the Atlanta PD, who had characterized Stoner as a "dangerous agitator," saw Stoner in Atlanta an hour before the assassination. With this kind of close surveillance of the Milteer crowd, it would appear that the Atlanta office was very concerned about the violence potential of this group.

#### Red Scare

In an article ("The Loyal American Underground") in the